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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND DISPOSITION 
IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction on 
March 27, 1969, for passing and uttering a ficticious 
check in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953). 
He was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison of one to ten years by Judge 
Charles G. Cowley of the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the jury verdict of 
guilty and sentence passed thereupon should be 
affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's recital of facts is substantially cor-





THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DIS-
CRETION IN PERMITTING THE STA TE TO INTRO-
DUCE DEFENDANT'S ALIAS IN EVIDENCE. 
It is an elementary proposition that the trial 
judge has wide discretion in passing upon the ad-
missibility of evidence. Ernest F. Kyriopoulos of the 
State Driver's License Division testified for the prose-
cution that the defendant used an alias, Richard 
Feeney, on his application for a driver's license. 
After an objection by the defense, Judge Cowley 
reserved a ruling on the materiality of this evidence 
upon the prosecution's offer to connect it up to the 
jury issues (T. 41). Contrary to appellant's allega-
tion, the State did endeavor to demonstrate the ma-
teriality of the alias. The check in issue at the trial, 
allegedly signed by an "Ethel Norris", bore a hand-
written account number differing in only one digit 
from defendant's own account number (T. 51-53). The 
prosecution attempted to show, by reference to an-
other of defendant's checks signed Richard Feeney 
bearing a handwritten account number, that de-
fendant knew from memory his own account num-
ber (T. 100-03). The evidence of the alias was neces-
sary to connect the two checks, and hence, an es-
sential part of the evidential chain. 
Further, it is difficult to imagine how this evi-
dence could have inflammed the jury to the point 
that reversible error was committed. Appellant 
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strangely regards admission of the alias more preju-
dicial than his own evidence of his two prior con-
victions for writing checks on insufficent funds (T. 
69-70). 
"After hearing an appeal the court must 
give judgment without regard to errors or de-
fects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. If error has been committed, 
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The Court must be satisfied that it 
has that effect before it is warranted in re-
versing the judgment." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-42-1 (1953). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF AN EIGHT MAN JURY 
AND HIS CONSENT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY OF 
SEVEN ARE VALID IN LAW. 
When one of the jurors tryng appellant's case 
became ill, the defense stipulated that the trial could 
continue with seven jurors. 
MR. RICHARDS: "Your Honor, based upon the 
fact that one of the jurors has become ill since 
the beginning of the trial, the defendant is 
willing to stipulate that the jury now em-
paneled may determine the case with a num-
ber of seven on the jury in lieu of the eight." 
(T. 61) 
It is well settled in all federal and state courts 
which have considered the matter that a defendant 
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may waive his right to a full jury and consent to be 
tried by fewer than the constitutional or statutory 
number. This rule is most frequently applied in the 
"sick juror" cases, to-wit: Patton z:. United States, 281 
U.S. 276, 312 (1930); Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 
185 (1967); Williams z:. United States, 332 F2d 36, 39 
(1964); Timmons u. State, 223 Ga. 450, 156 S.E.2d 68, 69 
(1968); State v. Robbins, 176 Ohio 362, 199 N.E.2d 742 
(1964); Holloway v. State, 365 P.2d 829, 831 (Okla. Crim. 
1961). 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78-
46-5 (1953) makes an eight man jury in a felony case 
"unwaivable." 
"A trial jury in capital cases shall consist 
of twelve jurors. A trial jury in other criminal 
cases and in civil cases in the District Courts 
shall consist of eight jurors; provided, that in 
civil cases and cases of misdemeanors the jury 
may consist of any number less than eight upon 
which the parties may agree in open court .... " 
Although this statute does not specifically give 
appellant the right to stipulate to be tried by a jury 
of fewer than eight, the right to waive a trial by 0 
full jury has existed historically and is not extin -
guished by the statute. California has dealt several 
times with this identical problem. Article 1, S0ctb:r 
7 of the California Constitution after which the Utah 
statute was patterned provides as follows: 
"In civil actions and cases of misde-
meanors the jmy may consist of twelve, or of 
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any number less than twelve upon which the 
parties may agree in open court." 
The argument that this impliedly excludes, by 
failing to mention, felony cases has been rejected in 
a number of cases, to-wit: People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. 
App. 2d 676, 2 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1964); People v. Patterson, 
169 Cal. App. 2d 179, 186-87, 337 P.2d 163, 168 (1959); 
People v. Williams, 128 Cal. App. 2d 458, 465, 275 P.2d 
513, 517 (1954); People v. Clark, 24 Cal. App. 2d 302, 
74 P.2d 1070 (1938). 
The ancient rule of expresso unius est exclusio alternius 
should not be applied when it will serve to extin-
guish an established custom, usage or practice. 2 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 4917 at 421 (3d. 
ed. F. Horack, 1943). As indicated by the cases cited 
above, it is a standard practice to permit defendant 
to waive trial by a full jury and consent to be tried 
by a smaller jury. No worthwhile purpose would 
be served by permitting appellant to affirm at trial, 
then deny on appeal, the competency of a seven 
man jury to decide his case. 
CONCLUSION 
Permitting an alias used by the defendant to be 
introduced in evidence was not an abuse of the trial 
court's broad discretionary powers. The prosecution 
connected up the evidence, but even if it had not, 
its admission cannot be considered reversible error. 
Appellant should not be granted a new trial on the 
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grounds that he should not have been permitted 
to stipulate to a smaller jury. Even if this were error, 
it was appellant's own error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
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